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Firms as Producers vs. Consumers of Skills: 
An Optimal Inventory Strategy 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper addresses the circumstances under which firms are willing to make long-term in-
vestments in a skilled workforce and produce a high-quality workforce themselves rather than 
rely on skills that are produced elsewhere (within the education system or by other compa-
nies). The authors apply the inventory theory to strategic HR planning in order to explain how 
firms decide on their optimal "inventory of skills" produced ahead of time to meet future de-
mand. The authors use detailed information on different costs and benefits of training invest-
ments from the firm’s perspective (BIBB CBS 2012) and apply a negative binomial model. 
The results show that firms are willing to invest in a larger inventory of skilled workers, i.e. to 
train more apprentices, firstly, if the costs of producing and retaining these skills (overage 
costs) are lower, secondly, if the costs of being short of skills in the future (underage costs) 
are higher, and thirdly, given an identical cost structure, if the demand for skills is likely to be 
high in the future. The findings have important policy implications for firms’ incentives to 
invest in apprenticeship training.  
 
 
 
Keywords: inventory decision, apprenticeship, overage and underage costs, demand structure  
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Introduction 
Firms want to have (enough) highly qualified workers available when needed in order to 
avoid delays and deficiencies that may eventually cause dissatisfied customers and lost sales. 
Under some circumstances, firms are willing to make long-term investments in a skilled 
workforce and produce a high-quality workforce themselves whereas sometimes, they rather 
rely on skills that are produced elsewhere (within the education system or by other compa-
nies). Hence, firms pursue an optimal inventory strategy for skills to meet (future) demand for 
highly qualified workers. 
The example of an ice-cream parlor intuitively explains the challenges and problems regard-
ing inventory decisions in general: 'Sorry, we have run out of ice-cream' not only leaves a 
customer dissatisfied on a hot summer's day, but also causes a missed business opportunity 
and lost sales both in the short and long run. Conversely, a huge inventory of ice-creams cre-
ates excessive storage costs and a potential loss of investments in case of spoilage. 
Considering the trade-off between expected costs of being overstocked or understocked, the 
ice-cream parlor has to decide in the morning on how much to produce for that day. Thereby, 
the parlor neither exactly knows how much the demand for ice-cream will be nor has the op-
tion to correct the production decision during the day as it would be too time-consuming. Ob-
viously, the demand will heavily depend on both endogenous factors such as the location of 
the ice-cream shop as well as exogenous factors such as weather. On a hot and sunny day, the 
parlor will sell more than on a rainy day and it thus makes sense to produce more on a sunny 
day. This example of highlights that an optimal inventory strategy has to reduce the anticipat-
ed costs of having an over- or understocked inventory while dealing with the uncertainty of 
future demand. 
Analogously, firms need an optimal inventory strategy for skills in order to have enough em-
ployees on a constantly high-quality level: firms have to decide on how many unskilled work-
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er, e.g. apprentices, to train for skill requirements that they may or may not have in the future. 
Building an inventory of skills reduces the risk of underage costs due to a shortage of skilled 
workers. Yet, excessive inventory of trained apprentices causes overage costs. Moreover, the 
training intensity depends on the expected need for skilled workers who are able to complete 
tasks independently and produce high quality no matter what product demand or production 
requirements will actually look like. In the future, skilled workers may or may not be required 
with the result that an excess of trained apprentices causes overage costs whilst a shortage of 
trained apprentices causes underage costs. In this regard, inventory models explain a firm’s 
incentives to produce a specific inventory of skills given the two opposing costs as well as 
relevant circumstances such as the expected labor market situation.  
By applying the classical inventory model, we explain a firm’s decision on the optimal level 
of producing skills, i.e. training apprentices, ahead of time. We use detailed German firm-
level data on different costs and benefits, which allows us to comprehensively investigate all 
three determinants of an inventory decision: overage costs, underage costs, and the demand 
structure. 
Literature Review 
Two main studies have addressed a firm’s training decision in a similar theoretical frame-
work. First, Cappelli (2008) sheds light on talent inventory from a make or buy perspective. 
He points out that mismatch in employees and skills is the greatest risk in talent management 
(Cappelli 2015). He affirms that undershooting talents can be offset by outside hiring whereas 
overshooting brings significant costs of trained talent that may walk away. Second, Backes-
Gellner (1996) points out that a shortage of qualified and adaptable workers is detrimental for 
the flexibility in production, for machine downtimes, for response capacity and for the corre-
sponding competitiveness and economic development of firms, particularly in highly com-
petitive and quality-oriented markets. Moreover, the topic of skills inventories is of particular 
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importance when considering high employee fluctuations as well as skills shortages and re-
spective hiring difficulties (Bellmann et al. 2015; BMBF 2015; Bussmann 2015; Czepek et al. 
2015). 
Most previous literature, starting with Becker (1964), explain the willingness to train individ-
uals by a simple investment model where discounted costs and benefits determine firms’ 
training decisions, assuming that future demand for skills is approximately known. Benefits 
occur only in case of specific training due to a gap between the firm’s internal wage and the 
market wage. However, such models cannot explain apprenticeship training in case of general 
skills despite net costs. Moreover, these models do not tackle the costs of not having invested 
sufficiently in skilled workers. Later, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999) extended Becker’s 
classical human capital model by arguing that investing in general training pays off in the 
future because of additional benefits that occur due to market frictions.  
Further research implicitly studies benefits of trained apprentices after the actual training such 
as the retention of trained apprentices who are most suitably skilled, the respective tenure, 
wages depending on mobility after training, and the effect of alternative recruitment from the 
external labor market (e.g., Booth & Satchell 1994; Winkelmann 1996; Euwals & Winkel-
mann 2002; Wolter 2008; Mohrenweiser & Backes-Gellner 2010; Hoeschler & Backes-
Gellner 2017). Whereas these studies focus on training benefits, a number of recent studies 
look more into the details of training costs as well as their influence on the decision to train in 
different contexts (Muehlemann, Schweri, Winkelmann & Wolter 2007; Wolter & Ryan 
2011; Blatter, Muehlemann, Schenker & Wolter 2016; Jansen, Pfeifer, Schönfeld & Wenzel-
mann 2015). In addition, others focus on hiring costs and their structure, height and influence 
(Blatter, Muehlemann & Schenker 2012; Muehlemann & Pfeifer 2016). One potential motive 
explaining training investments is direct recruitment of the former apprentice, where internal 
training of apprentices thereby replaces hiring of skilled workers from the external labor mar-
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ket (Merrilees 1983; Stevens 1994)5. By and large, the majority of firms train apprentices for 
investment purposes, i.e. to satisfy their future demand for skilled labor (Mohrenweiser & 
Backes-Gellner 2010; Muehlemann et al. 2010; Muehlemann, Pfeifer & Wenzelmann 2015). 
All these authors indirectly address the question of skill shortages but do not explicitly model 
the costs associated with different degrees of shortage or excess of skills. 
We contribute to the existing research by explicitly addressing the costs of being short of 
skilled labor and the opposite costs of producing an excess inventory of skilled workers, while 
explicitly taking into account the probabilities of ending up in one or the other situation (as 
represented by the demand structure in the ice-cream parlor example). 
Theoretical Background: The inventory model 
The inventory theory provides several models with different degrees of specification that ap-
ply depending on the nature of the specific circumstances6. In general, the theory proposes 
that holding costs are proportional to the quantity and time of inventoried goods, that ordering 
costs are fixed as well as decreasing with quantity, that the rate for demand is constant over 
time and known with certainty, and that lead time is constant (Harris, 1913; Erlenkotter, 
1990). The classic inventory model is suitable for considering the optimal inventory strategy 
in the context of apprenticeship training because it further assumes that firms have to decide 
in advance on how much inventory to produce, i.e. how many apprentices to train, firms are 
bound to their decision for the training period with the duration of approximately three years, 
the expected demand for skills cannot be predicted with certainty, and firms face some 
probability to end up with too many or not enough apprentices in the future. 
                                                
5 Indeed, data from German firms shows that the share of apprentices employed in the training firm 
one year after graduation corresponds to about two-thirds of all apprentices (BIBB 2016). 
6 Chikán classifies different groups of models according to seven characteristics (1990, p. 107 ff.). 
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The decision on the optimal level of skills inventory, i.e. number of apprentices, depends on 
the two opposing cost components, underage and overage costs, on the assumed underlying 
demand structure as well as on their interaction7: 
A∗  =  f (OC,UC,DS,DSxCR), with 
A*:  optimal inventory of skills, i.e. optimal number of apprentices, 
OC:  overage costs, 
UC:  underage costs, 
CR: critical ratio, 
DS:  demand structure. 
Overage Costs, Underage Costs, and Demand Structure 
To begin with, overage costs originate from training apprentices internally that may not be 
needed in the future. These overage costs are analogous to holding costs of inventory in an 
ice-cream parlor: after investing time and ingredients into the production, excess ice-cream is 
held in inventory until a customer demands it. While doing so, the stored ice-cream could 
melt or even spoil completely. Similarly, producing skilled workers requires time and money. 
If too many apprentices are trained, the firm is stuck with inventory, thereby facing storage 
costs, e.g. wage, or even emigration (Cappelli 2008). Hence, if firms overshoot demand, they 
encounter costs of having excess inventory. Since expected costs of a surplus increase mono-
tonically with increasing inventory, we expect a firm’s overage costs to be negatively related 
to the level of skills inventory held (Backes-Gellner 1996). 
In contrast, underage costs derive from not having enough skilled workers (or trained appren-
tices) available when needed. In this case, the ice-cream parlor has to deal with unsatisfied 
customers and lost sales. Alternatively, a shortage of ice-cream can be recouped by immedi-
                                                
7 The inventory decision itself occurs at a specific point in time. We refrain from discounting the costs 
due to our focus on short- and medium term effects. 
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ately replenishing ice-cream inventories through external suppliers. Similarly, consuming 
trained apprentices beyond built inventories makes the firm experience delays and deficien-
cies which, in turn, cause lost business opportunities unless substitute workers are found in 
due time (Cappelli 2008). Hiring skilled workers from the external labor market brings its 
own costs, though, which are comparable to ordering costs of inventory. Hence, if firms un-
dershoot demand, they are confronted with a risk of being short of inventory. Since	expected 
costs of a shortage decrease monotonically with increasing inventory, we expect a firm’s un-
derage costs to be positively related to the level of skills inventory held (Backes-Gellner 
1996). Generally, outside hiring can be considered as a benchmark for overage costs as it pro-
vides an accessible alternative to internal training and subsequent retention of apprentices 
(Cappelli 2008). 
Furthermore, the demand structure represents a firm’s expectations of future demand. In the 
context of the ice-cream parlor, the demand for ice-cream in a given season or on a given day 
is uncertain and depends on unknown factors such as the weather. Similarly, future demand 
for skilled workers is unknown, the probability distribution is known, though. Hence, the den-
sity function in Figure 1 describes the probability that the amount (a) of skilled workers is 
actually demanded in the future (Backes-Gellner 1996). As a simplification, we consider two 
opposing extremes for the probability density of skills demand: very high and very low de-
mand expectations8. A positively skewed density function represents a high probability for 
high expected demand for skilled workers, i.e. a high probability that many skilled workers 
are needed in the future [Figure 1b]. In contrast, a negatively skewed density function charac-
                                                
8 Generally, we assume that the demand for skills is a derived demand. The specific operationalization 
of high and low demand follows in the next chapter. 
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terizes a high probability for low expected demand for skills, i.e. a high probability that few 
skilled workers are needed in the future [Figure 1c]9.  
--- Figure 1 here --- 
Accordingly, the distribution function in Figure 2 shows the cumulative demand of skilled 
workers (Backes-Gellner 1996). 
--- Figure 2 here --- 
Optimal Inventory 
The optimal inventory level is calculated by minimizing the expected sum of the two speci-
fied cost components, overage costs and underage costs, given the demand structure. Total 
costs are a stochastic variable C(D,a) with the following properties (Backes-Gellner 1996):  
C D, a =  OC max 0, a− D +  UC max(0,D− a) 	
where a firm ends up with overage costs if it has trained more apprentices than demanded, 
and underage costs if it demands more apprentices than trained. 
In order to deduct hypotheses for a firm’s optimal inventory strategy, we assume cost minimi-
zation as optimality criterion. Thus, the specific amount a* of skills inventory minimizes the 
expected value of underage costs and overage costs10: 
DS a∗ = !!!!"!" = !"!"!!" = CR, with 
D:  demand for skilled workers, 
a: level of skills inventory, i.e. number of apprentices, 
DS(a): distribution function of the demand for qualifications11, i.e. the probabil-
ity that demand for skilled workers is actually needed in the future, 
                                                
9 Both probability densities can be characterized by a beta prime distribution which enables a formal 
analysis of the optimal inventory level given different cost structures (Backes-Gellner 1996, p. 61-62). 
10 The comprehensive mathematical derivation can be found in Backes-Gellner (1996, p. 54-55). 
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OC:  overage costs, 
UC:  underage costs, 
CR:  critical ratio. 
Consequently, the optimal inventory level depends on the assumed distribution function of 
demand as well as on the relation of a firm’s overage (OC) and underage costs (UC), as ex-
pressed by the critical ratio (CR). A high critical ratio results from high underage costs or 
from low overage costs, i.e. if underage costs are relatively high compared to overage costs 
[Figure 3, dashed line]. By contrast, a low critical ratio results from low underage costs or 
from high overage costs, i.e. underage costs are relatively low compared to overage costs 
[Figure 3, dotted line]. 
Hypotheses 
Generally, we expect a firm to build a higher skills inventory by training apprentices if over-
age costs are relatively small compared to underage costs, i.e. in case of a high critical ratio. 
However, Figure 3 shows that firms may provide little training despite low overage costs (and 
hence, a high critical ratio) if future demand is expected to be low, or that firms may provide 
much training despite high overage costs (and hence, a low critical ratio) if future demand is 
expected to be high. In fact, we find the optimal level of skills inventory for both, low and 
high demand expectations, by identifying the x-axis value for a specific critical ratio on the y-
axis of the distribution function of skills demand. Overall, the critical ratio (e.g. high under-
age costs compared to overage costs) together with the demand structure (e.g. high expected 
demand) have a positive, enhancing effect on the inventory of skills. 
--- Figure 3 here --- 
                                                                                                                                                   
11 Given that OC and UC are both greater or equal to zero, a corresponding distribution function DS(a) 
implies a second derivation larger than zero, i.e. the equation presents a cost minimum. Furthermore, 
for a continuous distribution, there is always an optimal level of inventory a*. 
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To sum up, we formulate the following hypotheses on the optimal number of apprentices in a 
firm (analogous to Backes-Gellner 1996): 
H1:  The lower a firm’s overage costs, the higher is c.p. its investment in an inventory of 
skilled workers, i.e. the more apprentices are trained. 
H2:  The lower a firm’s underage costs, the lower is c.p. its investment in an inventory of 
skilled workers, i.e. the less apprentices are trained. 
H3:  Given an identical cost structure, the higher the probability of a high firm’s expected 
demand for skilled workers, the higher is its investment in an inventory of skilled work-
ers, i.e. the more apprentices are trained. 
H4:  The higher firm’s critical ratio, i.e. the underage costs in relation to overage costs, in 
combination with its demand structure, the higher is its investment in an inventory of 
skilled workers, i.e. the more apprentices are trained. 
Institutional framework and data 
German apprenticeship training 
We apply the described inventory model to the German apprenticeship system where appren-
ticeship training has had a long tradition as a major upper secondary education pathway for 
young adults. Close to 60%of a cohort of school graduates enters the so-called “dual system” 
of apprenticeship training and train in one of the 320 registered occupations (BIBB 2016). 
The duration of apprenticeships is 2 to 3.5 years. Apprentices spend about 70-80% of their 
time in the training firm, where they are trained on-the-job and according to the respective 
training curricula. In addition, they visit vocational schools.  
The firm decides on the number of apprentices that it takes on given its expected demand as 
well as costs and benefits. The apprentices formally apply to these positions at the firm itself. 
	 	 14 
At the end of the training period, the apprentice takes an external exam that is organized by 
the respective regional chambers and standardized on the national level.  
Data  
The data for our empirical analysis stems from the Federal Institute for Vocational Education 
and Training (BIBB) that conducts firm-level surveys on the costs and benefits of apprentice-
ship training since the 1980s (e.g. Beicht, Walden & Herget 2004; Schoenfeld et. al 2010; 
Schoenfeld, Jansen, Wenzelmann & Pfeifer 2016). The most recent cross-section survey re-
fers to the training year of 2012 to 2013 and includes interviews in 3000 training and 900 
non-training firms.  
The sample of firms was drawn from the administrative firm register at the Federal Employ-
ment Agency. The interviewers used the CAPI method (computer-assisted personal inter-
view), i.e. they visited the firms in person to collect the information. The questions about the 
costs and benefits of training refer to one specific occupation, which was selected randomly 
among the trained occupations at the beginning of the interview.  
For the purpose of our analysis, we merge the firm-level data with aggregated data from other 
sources including register data collected by the Federal Employment Office as well as admin-
istrative data, and business-cycle data from the Federal Statistical Office. 
Variable construction 
The independent variable overage costs originates from training (and retaining) apprentices 
internally. In the context of apprenticeship training, overage costs include the following com-
ponents: a) obsolescence, i.e. the partial loss of investment e.g. due to a lack of forward-
looking qualifications, b) migration, i.e. full loss of investment due to a movement of the 
skilled worker to another firm, and c) set-up costs, i.e. net costs invested to train apprentices. 
We thus construct Total Overage Costs (in Euros per apprentice) as follows: 
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Total Overage Costs =  Net Training Costs !"#$%$%& !"#$%&'(  ∗  (1 + Retention Risk) 
First, Net Training Costs in Euros include the average gross costs, e.g. costs for apprentices 
(wages), costs for trainers, physical costs and other costs, minus the corresponding benefits 
such as productive contribution of apprentices during their training12. Yet, non-training firms 
might not train apprentices because they face significantly higher net training costs compared 
to training firms (Wolter, Muehlemann & Schweri 2006). Hence, training costs for non-
training firms would systematically differ if they were to switch to a training policy. Muehle-
mann et al. (2010) provide a solution to this problem by using selection models to investigate 
the potential costs and benefits of non-training companies. Analogously, we estimate training 
costs for non-training firms with identical Heckman models and the same exclusion re-
striction, i.e. availability of skilled workers13 The Training Duration in years allows us to 
calculate the net training costs for the whole duration of the apprenticeship training. Second, 
the Retention Risk represents the expected share of trained apprentices that emigrate to anoth-
er firm, both voluntarily or involuntarily. Since emigration is comparable to a full loss, we 
add it to the costs.  
The independent variable underage costs derives from not having enough skilled workers (or 
trained apprentices) available when needed. In the context of apprenticeship training, under-
age costs include a) outage costs due to lost business opportunities, b) costs for hiring substi-
tute worker from the external labor market in order to avoid a loss of sales, and c) miscast 
costs due to an erroneous appointment of substitute workers. 
We thus construct Total Underage Costs (in Euros per position) as follows: 
Total Underage Costs = Hiring Costs +  Outage Costs !"#"$#% !"#$%&'( ∗ (1 +  Miscast Risk) 
                                                
12 For detailed compilation of the various costs and benefits see Jansen, Pfeifer, Schönfeld & 
Wenzelmann (2015). 
13 For details and calculation methods see Muehlemann et al. (2010). Net Training Costs for training 
compared to non-training firms in Germany differ less than in Switzerland.  
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First, Hiring Costs in Euros per position include searching and recruiting costs as well as ad-
justment costs including (long-run) productivity differences14. Analogous to the net training 
costs, non-hiring firms might face systematically different hiring costs. Again, we estimate 
recruitment costs for non-hiring firms with Heckman models and the exclusion restriction, 
namely the realignment of the production15.  
Second, Outage Costs in Euros per position represent the lack of skilled employees leading to 
delays and deficiencies which, in turn, cause lost business opportunities both in the short and 
long run. We estimate this loss of sales by means of the value added, i.e. sales output minus 
input, per employee as an average per federal state and industry and for the vacancy time dur-
ing which skilled worker is missing. The Vacancy Duration in years allows us to calculate the 
outage costs for the actual duration of the vacancy. We use the vacancy on a community and 
occupational level as collected by the Federal Employment Office. Third, the Miscast Risk 
represents the expected share of erroneous appointments. Since a miscast induces further out-
age costs as well as another recruitment process, we add it to the costs. And finally, we 
dropped 10 observations (0.30% of the sample) with negative Total Underage Costs because 
they question the employment itself. 
Additionally, the independent variable Demand Structure portrays expectations of demand for 
skilled workers in the future. It can be interpreted as derived demand resulting from the mar-
ket demand for goods produced and services performed. We use the industry volatility, i.e. 
the sales fluctuations per employee for a specific industry in a given region, to illustrate a 
firm’s production strategy and competitive situation. A high volatility thereby shows that in-
dustry sales can continuously vary on a large scale. In order to permanently meet the unpre-
dictable demand for skills, workers need to be functionally flexible employable with corre-
                                                
14 For detailed compilation of the various costs and benefits see Jansen et al. (2015). 
15 For details and calculation methods see Muehlemann and Pfeifer (2016). 
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spondingly high and broad qualifications16. Temporary employment is a moderately suitable 
alternative due to employment protections. Furthermore, it is difficult to replace highly 
specialized skills with short-time work. Hence, firms build a large inventory of skilled work-
ers in advance by training apprentices. In contrast, in case of stable market conditions (e.g. 
public service), there is lower risk for lost business opportunities since sales and underlying 
demand for skilled workers are comparably predictable. Hence, firms build a smaller invento-
ry of skills. Lastly, the Interaction of the Critical Ratio, and Demand Structure represents the 
underage costs in relation to overage costs interrelated with the industry volatility.  
Description  
The dependent variable Number of Apprentices in a firm takes the form of count data with 
zero for non-training firms: in the sample (N=3,242), around 18% of the firms do not train, 
36% train one apprentice only, 0.5% train more than 60 apprentices, and one firm trains 700 
apprentices [Figure 4]. On average, a firm trains 4.5 apprentices. Considering the calibration 
weight for training and non-training firms in the whole population, only 27% of the firms ac-
tually train apprentices leading to an average of 0.6 apprentices per firm (and 2 apprentices 
per training firm). 
--- Figure 4 here --- 
In table 1, we further describe our main independent variables as well as their underlying 
components used for construction. First, Total Overage Costs amount to 23,060 Euros on 
average with Net Training Costs making up the biggest part of costs with a mean of 18,240 
Euros. Second, Total Underage Costs amount to 91,520 Euros on average. Outage Costs are 
by far the largest component with a mean of 68,740 Euros (75%). Third, regarding the De-
                                                
16 Backes-Gellner et al. (2016) discuss the importance of functional flexibility as key HR practice in 
more detail. 
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mand Structure, the average volatility of sales is around 4.5m Euros. Sales per employee 
fluctuate from min 24,000 to max 21.7m Euros depending on industry and region.  
Overall, underage costs are remarkably higher than overage costs. They are also much higher 
than assumed in previous literature because outage costs, which make up to 75% of total 
underage costs, have been neglected so far. 
--- Table 1 here --- 
In table 2, we report our two explanatory cost variables for different subgroups. Whereas 
overage costs hardly differ for training and non-training firms17, underage costs are much 
higher for training firms. Comparatively high underage costs are a potential reason for train-
ing as firms can avoid underage costs by hiring trained apprentices as skilled workers. Inter-
estingly, even if underage costs are on average (much) higher than overage costs, some firms 
do not train. These firms may either discount the future (especially prospective benefits) a lot 
or they may not take into account the long-term perspective of their optimal inventory strate-
gy at all. 
--- Table 2 here --- 
Empirical analysis 
Econometric modelling 
At the core of this paper is the question, how overage and underage costs shape a firm’s in-
ventory of skills, i.e. the number of apprentices presently trained in a firm. We prefer the neg-
ative binomial model over ordinary least square (OLS) model, because the latter fails to take 
into account the limited number of possible values of the dependent variable. Furthermore, 
the normal-distribution assumption of an OLS model is violated as shown in Figure 4. Con-
                                                
17 In Switzerland, overage costs (especially net training costs) would be much higher for non-training 
firms as opposed to training firms. For a comprehensive comparison of cost and benefits of German 
vs. Swiss apprenticeship training see Dionisius et al. (2009). 
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sidering the strongly skewed distribution of apprentices and the number of apprentices 
bounded at zero, we can interpret this outcome as a count variable (Cameron & Trivedi 2013). 
Accordingly, we aim for an estimation procedure that accounts for the Poisson-like distribu-
tion of the form	Pr ! = ! = !!! !!!! , where y is the observed number of counts and ! is the 
mean of the Poisson distribution. 
The first step in deciding whether to estimate a classical Poisson model is the test for overdis-
persion. Because a Poisson model implies E(yi|xi) = Var(yi|xi), we compare the mean of our 
dependent variable (i.e. the number of apprentices in a firm) with the variance of this variable. 
Because the variance is several times larger than the mean, we find evidence for overdisper-
sion. In this case, the literature suggests the use of the more efficient negative binomial re-
gression, which deals with the incidence of overdispersion (Wooldridge 2010).  
The estimated model has the form 
!! = exp(!! + β!!!!! !!" +  !!), 
where the number of counts !! is determined by the intercept !! and the independent varia-
bles β!!!". While !! in our application is the number of apprentices in firm i, our main inde-
pendent variables !! are the overage costs, underage costs and the demand structure for the 
firm. 
We control for a set of variables including Federal State (16), Training occupation on the 1st-
digit level (9) and the Firm’s Age (Majumdar 2007; Muehlemann et al. 2010; Czepek et al. 
2015; Zika et al. 2015). Furthermore, we control for Firm Size categories to account for po-
tential institutional and production technology differences between firms of different sizes 
(e.g. employment protection legislation). Because in Germany, firm- and sector-level institu-
tions are important determinants of the training participation (Kriechel, Muehlemann, Pfeifer 
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& Schuette 2014), we additionally control for the presence of a Worker Representation at the 
firm level, e.g. works council, as well as for existing Collective Agreements negotiated at sec-
tor level but valid at the firm. Finally, we use the number of employees in firm i as the expo-
sure variable in the model. By including the exposure variable, we technically regress the 
number of apprentices per employee in the firm (i.e. the apprentice rate) on or independent 
variables. The reasoning is that the number of apprentices in large firms is likely to be higher 
than the number of apprentices in a very small firm.18.  
Regression analysis 
The tables in this section provide the original coefficients of the negative binomial regression 
estimators. Because the interpretation of the coefficients is not straightforward, we further 
supply percentage changes that are calculated by estimating the incidence-rate ratios (IRR). 
Table 3 shows the negative binominal regression with the Number of Apprentices as our de-
pendent variable and Overage Costs (OC), Underage Costs (UC) and Demand Structure (DS) 
as the main explanatory variables. Column 1 provides estimates of the baseline model and 
Column 2 the model including the full set of structural and institutional variables. The 
estimates in Column 3 show that the overage costs are negatively related to the number of 
apprentices in a firm. An increase of one unit (i.e., 10.000 Euro) in the overage costs leads to 
a decrease in the number of trained apprentices of 4.1 percent. An increase in one unit of the 
underage costs, on the contrary, is associated with an increase of apprentices by about 0.1 
percent – a small but still significant effect. Furthermore, our proxy for the probability that 
firms have a high expected demand for highly skilled workers – the industry volatility – is 
positively related to the inventory of apprentices: An industry that is more volatile by one unit 
                                                
18 As described in Cameron and Trivedi (2013), an exposure variable is often used to analyse counts 
per unit of time, if the latter is not fixed. The reasoning is that a longer the period increases the number 
of counts. We transfer this argument to the number of apprentices in firms because larger firms usually 
have more apprentices than smaller firms. 
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(1m) is associated with an increase in the number of apprentices of 2.3 percent, which is a lot 
considering industry volatility reaching from 0 to 22m. 
Finally, as displayed in Columns 4 and 5, the demand structure in combination with the criti-
cal ratio (UC/UC+OC) is positive and significant, indicating that the influence of the overage-
underage-cost relationship on trained apprentices in a firm is stronger if industry volatility is 
higher. In contrast, the critical ratio alone is of little importance. It is relevant only in 
combination with high industry volatility. 
--- Table 3 here --- (two versions) 
In consequence, we confirm the relationships among the variables as formulated in our four 
hypotheses:  
H1:  The lower a firm’s overage costs, the higher is c.p. its investment in an inventory of 
skilled workers, i.e. the more apprentices are trained. 
H2:  The lower a firm’s underage costs, the lower is c.p. its investment in an inventory of 
skilled workers, i.e. the less apprentices are trained. 
H3:  Given an identical cost structure, the higher a firm’s expected future demand for skilled 
workers, the higher is its investment in an inventory of skilled workers, i.e. the more 
apprentices are trained. 
H4:  The higher firm’s critical ratio, i.e. the underage costs in relation to overage costs, in 
combination with its demand structure, the higher is its investment in an inventory of 
skilled workers, i.e. the more apprentices are trained. 
To understand which factors are driving the relationship between cost indicators and invento-
ry of skills, we provide an additional regression table including subcomponents of Total 
Overage Cost and Total Underage Costs [Table 4]. 
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With respect to the overage cost components, both Net Training Costs and the Retention Risk 
prove to be important drivers for the negative relationship between overage costs and the 
number of apprentices shown in table 3. Hence, the net costs invested to train apprentices as 
well as a potential loss of this investment due to a movement of the skilled worker to another 
firm are important determinants for a firm’s optimal inventory strategy.  
Regarding the underage costs, the main driver are the Outage Costs, i.e. the costs due to lost 
business opportunities. As opposed to Hiring Costs, Outage Costs are of greater scale and 
may occur over a persistent period of time rather than one-time only for hiring of substitute 
worker from the external labor market. The correspondingly large loss of sales can eventually 
cause a firm’s failure. Thus, taking into account the costs of lost sales when deciding about 
the optimal inventory strategy is very important for a firm’s (financial) survival. Finally, 
Miscast Costs, which are due to an erroneous appointment of substitute workers, contribute to 
the positive relationship between underage costs and the number of trained apprentices – as 
these miscast costs can be avoided by training apprentices within the firm and keeping them 
as skilled workers.  
--- Table 4 here --- 
As an alternative specification, we focus on the decision about the optimal number of 
apprentices (extensive margin) rather than the training decision itself. We thus restrict our 
sample to firms with at least one apprentice, i.e. training firms (intensive margin). The results 
look still similar with the exception of Underage Costs, which still go in the same direction 
but appear to be less important19. This could be due to the fact that these firms have already 
decided to train apprentices in the first place.  
--- Table 5 here --- 
                                                
19 For Swiss firms, Muehlemann et al. (2007) find that costs have a significant impact on the training 
decision but no significant influence on the number of apprentices, once the firm has decided to train. 
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Discussion 
Limitations 
Our data provides detailed information on different costs and benefits from a firm’s perspec-
tive including specific variables on investments in training and recruitment. Moreover, given 
the nature of data and the lack of suitable instruments, we thus cannot interpret our results as 
purely causal. However, we assume the costs to be exogenous. Particularly, firms with Col-
lective Agreements face pre-determined wages, which generally make up for most of the 
costs. The results for the subsample of firms with collective agreements still hold [Table 6]. 
However, the interaction of the demand structure with the critical ratio is not significant any-
more and has thus no enhancing effect on the inventory of skills. We also merge several vari-
ables from external datasets including the vacancy duration and occupational information on 
the sector and region level to diminish endogenously determined indicators of the firms them-
selves. 
--- Table 6 here --- 
Policy Implications 
Our results have important implications for policy and practice as they provide vocational 
training incentives targeted to market conditions and interests of firms. First, if overage costs 
are comparatively higher than underage costs, firms may not benefit from training 
apprentices. In order to incentivize firms to train apprentices, the government needs to design 
policy interventions that reduce overage costs, e.g. net training costs could be reduced through 
training subsidy schemes (Muehlemann et al. 2007)20. However, Bonin et al. (2014) found 
that training bonuses did not increase the willingness to provide apprenticeship training. 
                                                
20 According to Askilden and Nilsen (2005), subsidization is warranted since recruitment of 
apprentices is supposed to be an investment in skills guided by long-term considerations. 
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Hence, training subsidies are not the only policy intervention to incentivize firms to train 
apprentices. 
Second, and our main contribution to previous literature, if underage costs are comparatively 
higher than overage costs, firms would generally benefit from training apprentices. A possible 
Human Resource strategy in order to incentivize training would involve actively considering 
mid- to long-term underage costs. Especially quantifying outage costs shows that such 
savings are enormous for most firms. However, a necessary condition for reaping post-
training benefits is the retention of trained apprentices as skilled workers in order to save 
underage costs. 
Therefore, retention risk is a key issue21: the initial employer commits a training investment 
with the intention of recouping it through post-training benefits. However, other firms, who 
shifted to outside hiring of skilled workers rather than training apprentices and hence could 
afford to pay more, pose a risk of poaching away trained apprentices, i.e. losing training in-
vestments (Cappelli 2008). Although the government cannot force young people remain with 
their training firm (e.g. through a pay-back scheme), some measures could be taken in order 
to make apprentices stay. Amongst others, these include sustainable designs of a smooth 
transition after the apprenticeship training as well as specific inducements to stay in the firm 
after training. For example, high wages would increase the retention rate (Rinawi & Backes-
Gellner 2014). Higher wages, in turn, are justified through the underage costs, i.e. hiring and 
outage costs that can be saved in case of retention of trained apprentices as skilled workers. 
Our results suggest that firms – even in more flexible labor markets – can benefit from initial 
training investments without recouping net training costs during the training period itself if 
retention is credible. 
                                                
21 Table 4 shows the strong relation between Retention Risk and Number of Apprentices. 
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Overall, firms should emphasize underage costs when deciding about their optimal inventory 
strategy for skills. Consequentely, firms would more often become producers of skills rather 
than just remain consumers that are dependent on other firms’ apprenticeship training. 
Conclusion 
We apply the inventory theory to explain who holds more and who holds less inventory of 
skills22. By means of detailed information on different costs and benefits from a firm’s per-
spective (BIBB CBS 2012) and using the negative binomial regression model, we find that 
first, the lower a firm’s overage costs, the higher is its investments in inventory of skilled 
workers; second, the higher a firm’s underage costs, the higher is its investments in inventory 
of skilled workers; third, given an identical cost structure, firms in more volatile industries 
invest in higher levels of skilled workers inventory than firms in less volatile industries; and 
fourth, the combination of a firm’s critical ratio (underage costs in relation to overage costs) 
with its demand structure (industry volatility), has a positive, enhancing effect on inventory of 
skills23. Hence, firms in more demanding markets are more likely to take risk and invest in 
apprenticeship training. 
The results are in line with literature that explains training investments by both, training and 
post-training benefits. In addition to net training costs on the one side and hiring costs on the 
other side, we also considered outage costs which is a major cost of a shortage of skills. We 
find that underage costs are substantially larger than anticipated so far. The theoretical inven-
tory model is thus helpful to explain the optimal inventory of skills held. Analogously to 
Backes-Gellner (1996), we find that all three factors, the education system as well as the pro-
duction strategy and market conditions, significantly affect a firm’s inventory of skills. The 
                                                
22 Due to the linkage of employment and education, firms individually optimize the number of 
apprentices to train without the involvement of a central planner. 
23 Firms offering other professional skills development such as traineeship or further education of 
employees are expected to behave accordingly. 
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findings have important policy implications for firms’ incentives to invest in apprenticeship 
training. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Characteristic demand structures  
 
Notes: figure 1 shows characteristic demand structures for (a) uniform, (b) high, (c) low future, and 
(d) medium expected demand of skills (with a: level of skills inventory, and ds(a): density function of 
demand for specific level of skilled workers).  
Source: authors’ calculations based on Backes-Gellner (1996). 
 
Figure 2: Characteristic cumulative demand  
 
Notes: figure 2 shows characteristic cumulative demand for (a) uniform, (b) high, (c) low future, and 
(d) medium expected demand of skills (with a: level of skills inventory, and ds(a): distribution function 
of demand for specific level of skilled workers).  
Source: authors’ calculations based on Backes-Gellner (1996). 
 
Figure 3: Characteristic cumulative demand for given critical ratios 
 
Notes: figure 3 shows characteristic cumulative demand for (a) uniform, (b) high, (c) low future, and 
(d) medium expected demand of skills (with a: level of skills inventory, and ds(a): distribution function 
of demand for specific level of skilled workers, CRH: UC > OC and CRL: UC < OC).  
Source: authors’ calculations based on Backes-Gellner (1996).  
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Figure 4: Distribution of dependent variable Number of Apprentices 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics – Overview (Full sample) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
     
Number of Apprentices 0.574 4.403 0 700 
     
Overage Costs     
Total Overage Costsi) 2.306 2.133 -12.599 25.862 
Net Training Costs 1.824 1.694 -9.447 20.463 
Retention Risk 0.267 0.087 0.037 0.651 
     
Underage Costs     
Total Underage Costsii) 9.152 48.943 0.062 1607.334 
Hiring Costs 0.868 0.942 -0.51 16.658 
Outage Costs 6.874 41.294 -1.197 1371.456 
Miscast Risk 0.178 0.048 0.112 1.055 
     
Demand Structure     
Industry Volatility 4.519 7.24 0.024 21.665 
     
Controls     
Firm's Size 20.829 171.907 1 25341 
Firm's Age 29.745 47.475 1 919 
Collective Agreements (binary) 0.351 0.477 0 1 
Worker Representation (binary) 0.166 0.373 0 1 
Training Occupation          9 different training occupations 
Federal State         16 different federal states (regions) 
  
     
Number of observations          3242 observations 
     
Notes: table reports all costs in 10000 Euros per person with i) Total Overage Costs = Net Training 
Costs * (1+Retention Risk), and ii) Total Underage Costs = (Hiring Costs + Outage Costs)* 
(1+Miscast Risk).  
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics – Details (Subsamples) 
 
Total Overage 
Costs 
Total Underage 
Costs 
Number of  
Observations 
    
Training 2.186 13.506 2651 
Non-training 2.349 7.566 591 
    
Firm's Size (up to 9 employees) 2.361 9.52 969 
Firm's Size (10 to 49 employees) 2.025 8.235 1262 
Firm's Size (50 to 499 employees) 2.625 7.064 821 
Firm's Size (more than 500 employees) 2.795 11.643 190 
    
Firm's Age (up to 10 years old) 2.388 8.624 703 
Firm's Age (11 to 20 years old) 2.563 7.164 795 
Firm's Age (21 to 50 years old) 2.216 6.653 939 
Firm's Age (more than 51 years old) 1.773 18.689 805 
    
Collective Agreements 2.399 7.886 1586 
No Collective Agreements 2.255 9.838 1656 
    
Worker Representation 2.851 5.347 1146 
No Worker Representation 2.197 9.912 2096 
    
Training occupation in agriculture, forestry, 
farming, and gardening 0.678 25.661 77 
Training occupation in production of raw ma-
terials and goods, and manufacturing 2.401 8.354 827 
Training occupation in construction, architec-
ture, surveying and technical building services 3.182 10.321 253 
Training occupation in natural sciences, geog-
raphy and informatics 3.73 3.737 104 
Training occupation in traffic, logistics, safety 
and security 2.233 2.545 192 
Training occupation in commercial services, 
trading, sales, the hotel business and tourism 1.757 2.897 676 
Training occupation in business organization, 
accounting, law and administration 2.319 21.207 756 
Training occupation in health care, the social 
sector, teaching and education 2.058 4.018 304 
Training occupation in philology, literature, 
humanities, social sciences, economics, media, 
art, culture, and design 
4.363 5.582 53 
    
Region: West 2.235 10.519 2610 
Region: East 2.606 3.353 632 
    
Total 2.306 9.152 3242 
    
Notes: table reports all costs at mean in 10000 Euros per person with i) Total Overage Costs = 
Net Training Costs * (1+Retention Risk), and ii) Total Underage Costs = (Hiring Costs + Outage 
Costs)* (1+Miscast Risk).  
Source: authors’ calculations.                                     
Table 3: Main Determinants of the Training Intensity (Optimal Inventory Level) 
 OC UC DS  Interaction CR DS 
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 (1) (2) %-change (2) (3) %-change (3) 
      
Overage Costs      
Total Overage Costs   -0.0550***   -0.0421*** -4.1241%   
   (0.018)      (0.015)       
Underage Costs      
Total Underage Costs    0.0008       0.0013*   0.1264%   
   (0.001)      (0.001)       
Demand Structure      
Industry Volatility    0.0260***    0.0223**  2.2571%    0.0256**  2.5922% 
   (0.010)      (0.010)       (0.010)     
Interaction CR DS      
Critical Ratio      -0.0005    -0.0478% 
      (0.001)     
Critical Ratio x Volatility       0.0001**  0.0079% 
      (0.000)     
      
Constant   -3.1681***   -4.0958***    -4.0828***  
   (0.083)      (0.490)       (0.488)     
      
Controls      
Firm's Size  included included included included 
Firm's Age  included included included included 
Collective Agreements  included included included included 
Worker Representation  included included included included 
Training Occupation  included included included included 
Federal State  included included included included 
      
      
Number of observations 3242 3242 3242 3242 3242 
Pseudo R^2 0.009 0.040 0.040 0.038 0.038 
      
Notes: table reports marginal effects of a negative binomial regression; all costs are in 10000 Euros 
per person; %-change calculated as (incidence-rate ratio-1)x100; dependent variable: Number of 
Apprentices; standard errors in parentheses; *statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 
level; *** at the .01 level.  
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4: Subdivided Determinants of the Training Intensity 
 Euro Determinant  All Determinants 
 (1) (2) %-change (2) 
    
Overage Costs    
Net Training Costs   -0.0503***   -0.0499*** -4.8700% 
   (0.019)      (0.019)     
Retention Risk    -2.6112*** -92.6557% 
    (0.783)     
    
Underage Costs    
Hiring Costs 
   0.0069      -0.0271    
 
-2.6705% 
   (0.054)      (0.052)     
Outage Costs    0.0014*      0.0019**  0.1916% 
   (0.001)      (0.001)     
Miscast Costs     0.8417*   131.9156% 
    (0.505)     
    
Demand Structure    
Industry Volatility 
   0.0222**     0.0263*** 
 
2.6631% 
   (0.010)      (0.010)     
    
Constant   -4.1091***   -2.8052***  
   (0.494)      (0.667)     
Controls    
Firm's Size included included  
Firm's Age included included  
Collective Agreements included included  
Worker Representation included included  
Training Occupation included included  
Federal State included included  
    
    
Number of observations 3242 3242 3242 
Pseudo R^2 0.040    0.044    0.044 
    
Notes: table reports marginal effects of a negative binomial regression; all costs are in 10000 Euros 
per person; %-change calculated as (incidence-rate ratio-1)x100; dependent variable: Number of 
Apprentices; standard errors in parentheses; *statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 
level; *** at the .01 level.  
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5: Main Determinants of the Training Intensity for Training-Firms 
 OC UC DS  Interaction CR DS 
 (1) %-change (1) (2) %-change (2) 
     
Overage Costs     
Total Overage Costs   -0.0255*** -2.5164%   
   (0.005)       
Underage Costs     
Total Underage Costs    0.0002    0.0191%   
   (0.000)       
Demand Structure     
Industry Volatility    0.0149*** 1.5004%    0.0155*** 1.564% 
   (0.003)       (0.003)     
Interaction CR DS     
Critical Ratio      0.0004    0.036% 
     (0.000)     
Critical Ratio x Volatility      0.00004*** 0.0044% 
     (0.000)     
     
Constant   -4.0449***    -4.0439***  
   (0.175)       (0.175)     
Controls     
Firm's Size included  included  
Firm's Age included  included  
Collective Agreements included  included  
Worker Representation included  included  
Training Occupation included  included  
Federal State included  included  
     
     
Number of observations 2651 2651 2651 2651 
Pseudo R^2 0.144 0.144 0.141 0.141 
     
Notes: table reports marginal effects of a negative binomial regression for training-firms; all costs 
are in 10000 Euros per person; %-change calculated as (incidence-rate ratio-1)x100; dependent 
variable: Number of Apprentices; standard errors in parentheses; *statistically significant at the .10 
level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.  
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6: Main Determinants of the Training Intensity for Firms with Collective Agreements 
 OC UC DS  Interaction CR DS 
 (1) %-change (1) (2) %-change (2) 
     
Overage Costs     
Total Overage Costs   -0.0656*** -6.3453%   
   (0.017)       
Underage Costs     
Total Underage Costs    0.0012*   0.1156%   
   (0.001)       
Demand Structure     
Industry Volatility    0.0318*** 3.2291%    0.0353*** 3.5887% 
   (0.010)       (0.010)     
Interaction CR DS     
Critical Ratio      0.0420    4.2882% 
     (0.028)     
Critical Ratio x Volatility     -0.0019    -0.1892% 
     (0.001)     
     
Constant   -3.5788***    -3.6384***  
   (0.540)       (0.532)     
Controls     
Firm's Size   included  
Firm's Age   included  
Worker Representation   included  
Training Occupation   included  
Federal State   included  
     
     
Number of observations 1586 1586 1586 1586 
Pseudo R^2 0.073 0.073 0.068   0.068   
     
Notes: table reports marginal effects of a negative binomial regression for firms with collective 
agreements; all costs are in 10000 Euros per person; %-change calculated as (incidence-rate ratio-
1)x100; dependent variable: Number of Apprentices; standard errors in parentheses; *statistically 
significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.  
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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